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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
NIXON & NIXON, INC.,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 16989

JOHN NEW & ASSOCIATES,. INC.,
Defendant and
Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE

This is an action for specific performance of
a written contract.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The,case was tried in the District Court of Weber
County to the Honorable Calvin Gould sitting without a jury
on the 14th day of February, 1980.

The Court entered a

judgment restoring the parties to their status before the
Agreement, relieving the Respondent JOHN NEW & ASSOCIATES,
INC., hereinafter referred to as New, from any duty to
convey the property and awarded a money judgment to the
Plaintiff/Appellant NIXON & NIXON, INC., hereinafter referred
to as Nixon, in the amount of $76,928.73, together with
interest in the amount of $20,562.83, and granted the
~i~;~~;~~
~ Library.
lien
onfor digitization
the property
to ofinsure
payment
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of

-2the judgment and interest.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Respondent New requests that this Court affirm
the judgment of Judge Gould.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
New was a general contractor, and the owner of a
parcel of real property consisting of approximately 20 acres
located in Weber County, Utah.

New had previously mortgaged

the property to Conunercial Security Bank, had defaulted on
the mortgage, and the property was sold at Sheriff's sale.
The period of redemption expired on the 20th day of November,
19 7 8 •

(T-12 8)
During the six-month redemption period, New sought

money to pay off the bank, or purchasers who would purchase
the property and thereby preserve for New his sustantial
equity in the property.
During this period of time, he, New, became acquainted
with Jerry Olson, an employee of Nixon.

New recited to Olson

the nature of his problem concerning the property and solicited

Olson's help in securing a buyer.

Olson requested a

formal listing on the property which New refused on the

.

.

grounds that he had other offer~, but did agree that in the
event Olson securea a purchaser for the property, he would
guarantee the payment of a commission.

(T-127, 128)

New

ultimately signed a letter of agreement to pay the commission.
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-3Sometime before the redemption period expired,
Olson informed New that he had a buyer for the property.
(T-130) However, two days prior to the expiration of the
redemption period, Olson advised New that the sale had
fallen through--that the buyer was no longer interested in
the property. Mr. New .testified,
" . . . he (Olson) said, Mr. Nixon would buy
it from me.
He said don't worry, I have got
it taken care of. Mr. Nixon is going to take
care of you."
(T-130, 131)
Nixon and New met for the first time on November 20,

1978, the date the redemption period expired.

Nixon agreed

to purchase the property for $130,000.00, of which approximately $76,000.00 would be required to redeem the property
from the Sheriff's sale and the balance of $54,000.00 would
be paid to New, ... "at a later date. " (T-13 3)
They secured the services of attorney Donald
Hughes, Jr. to draft the agreement.

c.

The parties met at the

office of Attorney Hughes at approximately 4:00 o'clock in
the afternoon.

The contract was to be prepared and the

property to be redeemed by 5:00 o'clock that same afternoon.
The contract was marked Plaintiff's Exhibit C and admitted
into evidence.
At the time the contract was drawn, New considered
the value of the property to be $202,000.00.

(T-132)

He

advised Nixon that that was his value of the property and
Nixon indicated that he was not going to pay that price,
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-4but Nixon did agree to pay $130,000.00 for the property.
(T-133)
The contract provided among other things that
Nixon would pay the redemption price of $76,928.73; New
"would convey title to the property free and clear of all
liens"; and that Nixon "would use best efforts to prepare a
subdivision plat and proceed with engineering and development of the property at a· ·commercially reason·able speed."
The contract further provided that six months from
filing of the final plat, Nixon would pay to New the difference between the redemption price of $76,928.73 and $130,000.00.
After the payment of the redemption price by
Nixon, there was no further contact between Nixon and New
for an extended period of time.

Nixon did not execute and

deliver to New a Promissory Ncte as provided by the contract
·'

and New did not execute and deliver a deed to Nixon as
provided by the contract.
to contact Nixon.
1979.

New made many and repeated attempts

He wrote him a letter on January 9,

(T-137) New said regarding attempts to contact Nixon,

"I contacted them by mail two times, and I must
have call~d them twenty."
(T-138, 139)
New went to see Nixon en the 23rd of January, 1979
and found that Mr. Nixon's father'had just passed away and
Mr. Nixon was unavailable.

(T-139)

On February 8, New went to visit Nixon in Logan
to no avail, and subsequently sent him a message on the
12th of February in an attempt to set up a meeting in Ogden.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
(T-139)
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-5-

New went to Logan to visit with Nixon on the 7th
of February, but Nixon was entertaining some people there
and could not see him.

New stayed in Logan overnight

attempting to see him the following day and waiting for an
hour or so, but Nixon didn't show up.

Nixon's secretary

told New he wasn't corning in until afternoon so New stayed
until 2:00 o'clock, but Nixon did not show up and New returned
to Salt Lake City.
On February 28, New met with John Reeves of Reeves
Engineering in Ogden, and discussed the development of the
land and ultimately hired him to perform engineering services
in regard to development of the property.

(T-141)

There was no further contact between Nixon and New
until May of 1979 when Nixon discovered that New was proceeding to subdivide the property ... Nixon

file~

an action

against New and the matter proceeded to trial on February 14,
1980.
'ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT WAS CORRECT IN ITS DETERMINATION
THAT THE; CONTRACT WAS TOO VAGUE FOR SPECIFIC
ENFORCEMENT.
It has long been the po?ition of

th~

Courts that

contracts cannot and will not be enforced unless they are
specifically definite so that the Courts can enforce them
without re-writing the contract for the parties.

Our high

court made it clear in Bunnell v. Bills 368 P.2d 597, 13
Court said at page 600,
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"Furthermore, a contract can be enforced by the
courts only if the obligations of the parties are
set forth with sufficient definiteness that it can
be performed."
The contract now before the Court requires that
the buyer, Nixon, pay to the seller the difference between
the redemption price of $76,928.73 and $130,000.00, or
approximately $54,000.o'O six months after the final plat
has been filed.

The contract makes no requirement as to

when that plat will be filed and it obviously depends upon
preliminary engineering, approval of the City Council, etc.,
and the contract does not require that the subdivision plat
be prepared within a specific period of time.

In fact, the

contract says at paragraph 3,
"Buyer shall use best efforts to prepare a
subdivision plat and proceed with engineering
and development of the property at a commercially
reasonable speed."
Nowhere in the contract is the phrase "commercially
reasonable speed" defined.

The evidence heard at trial

indicates specifically that Mr. Nixon did little from the
date the property was purchased, i.e. November 20, 1978, to
develop the property.

By his own testimony, the first

action he took was in December and he simply contacted a
land design company and had them take a look

~t

it.

He

admitted,
"They didn't perform any services on it. They
did look at it, went down and took a look. But
they didn't actually bill me any work." (T-90)
Nixon then had another person, Jay Carlson, go
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-7Nixon said that he then hired a Mr. Schwartz to do some
surveying and engineering, but Schwartz did nothing until
May, 1979, at which time he made some sketches and drilled
some test holes on May 30, 1979.

(T-92)

It is clear that Nixon did nothing further on the
hear~

property until he

that Mr. New was developing the

property, at which time he filed his Notice of Lis Pendens
and cormnenced this action.
This evidence alone may not justify the Court's
ruling in this matter.

However, taking the totality of the

evidence heard at trial, it obviously became clear to the
Court that not only was the phrase "commercially reasonable
speed" vague and arnbigious, but the actions of Mr. Nixon
indicated a desire on his part to do nothing for an extended
period of time, if not to deliberately delay development.

It

is clear that New made many and repeated attempts to contact Nixon and discuss the development of the property;
New sent two letters, and must have called them twenty
times.

(T-139)

Nixon did not respond and his attitude is

characterized by his testimony when asked the question at
trial relating to the time that had elapsed from the November
purchase of the property until the 30th of
Q.

Dur~ng

M~y,

all this period of time, by the time

you got some test holes, did you ever have a conversation
with Mr. John New?
to which he responded,
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Why not?

A.

Why should I?

(T-92, 93)

Nixon then went on to admit that he had seen some
of the mail that had come from John New and that he had been
advised that Mr. New wanted to meet with him and he simply
what's

said, "

Jo~n

got to do· with it?"

(T-94)

By the very terms of the contract, New was to
deliver to Nixon a deed to the property.
Mr. New a

Nixon was to deliver to

Promissory Note for the approximate sum of $54,000.00.

It is simply not reasonable that Mr. Nixon would delay any
contact between himself and Mr. New because he was simply
too busy.
The above questions make a little more sense when
we look at the provision in the contract at paragraph 12,
which states,
"In the event, Buyer determines the development
is untenable, Buyer may require Seller to rebuy
the property for One Hundred Thousand Dollars
($100 '000. 00)."
The contract also provided at paragraph 13,
"Time is of the essence to this agreement."
This Court in Ferris· v. Je·nnings 595 P.2d 857
(1979) held in a case in which specific performance was
requested, at page 859 where the Court said,
"We have no disagreement with the general
proposition that a contract will not be
specifically enforced unless the obligations
of the parties are 'set forth with sufficient
definiteness that it can be performed.'
But
to be co·ns'ide·red therewith is the further-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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-9proposition that the parties to a contract are
obliged to proceed in good faith to cooperate
in erformin the contract in accordance with
its expressed intent."
Emphasis adde
It is obvious that Nixon did not proceed in good
faith to cooperate in performing the contract.
mony at the trial also

~ives

His testi-

some indication as to his

thinking and his motivation in causing the delay.

At the

time of trial he was asked,
Q.

Why didn't you think it was important to talk

to this man?
A.

It wasn't a matter of being important.

It was

it was a matter of I just wasn't available, was

important

busy as I could be.

(T-95)

Mr. Nixon's attitude was further clarified by his
statement at the time of trial when I asked him,
.•

Q.

Mr. Nixon, how much are you willing to give by

way of promissory note to Mr. New today in exchange for the
deed?
A.

Whatever I told you I would in that letter.

Q.

$9,000.00, right?

A.

Whatever it was.

Q.

$9,052.00.

(T-84)

Subsequently in the trial, I again asked the question of Mr.
Nixon,

Q. When you gave me a figure of $9,000.00 that you
would accept today, and he gave you a deed, and you gave him
~ nrnmissorv
n~te
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for $9,000.00, a lot of interest was

-10computed that reduced the $54,000.00 down to nine, wasn't
there?
A.

Well, I pulled off the terms of the contract

and it reduces it by twenty some odd thousand there.

And

then there is some lienp that haven't been expunged yet that
would have to be taken care of.

And there is interest on

the money that it has cost me in John holding me up from
getting that thing done.

(T-98)

The contract does not provide for interest which
Mr. Nixon admitted.

(T-97)

The Respondent New is certain that the< Coua:"t-1 ·· ·
looked at the totality of the arrangement between the parties,
the vagueness of the terms of the contract and the ability
of Mr. Nixon to refrain from taking action.
ultim~tely

The Court

held that the rights of' the defendant could not

be ascertained or enforced except at the whim or caprice of
the plaintiff and therefore found the contract unenforceable.
The logic of the Court was sound.

The capacity of Nixon to

manipulate that contract to his benefit was obvious, and it
was obvious that

he

did not care about the delay--the.delay

was simply inuring to his benefit and to the substantial
economic loss of Mr. New. It was· clear at the beginning of
the contract that Mr. New would be entitled to approximately
$54,000.00 less what it would cost him to remove some liens,
etc., but his interest was substantial and at the time of
trial, Mr. Nixon had now determined that New's interest had

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ARGUMENT
POINT II
THE COURT WAS CORRECT IN EXERCISING ITS
EQUITABLE RIGHTS TO DENY SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
OF THE CONTRACT.
We have heretotore discussed the Court's ruling in
Ferris v. Jennings in which the Court said at page 859,
"But to be considered therewith is the further
proposition that the parties to a contract are
obliged to proceed in good faith to cooperate
in performing the contract in accordance with
its expressed intent."
This Court in Otteson v. Malone 584 P.29 878
(1978) said at page 879,
"In determining a grant of specific performance
a court should examine the contract and the
circumstances pertaining to its execution and
formation, and determine whether there exist
equitable grounds to grant or deny specific
performance.
In this connection a court may
consider any evidence of ·concealment, overreaching, or misunderstanding on the part of
the contracting parties which might result in
a failure of ~eeting of the minds."
The Respondent does not claim fraud or misrepresentation in these matters, but it is clear by the evidence
that Mr. New had a very
valuable interest in this property
.
;

and the only way he could realize his equitable interest in
this property is to have it developed within a reasonable
period of time.

That was obviously his intent at the time

the contract was signed; he believed he would receive approximately $54,000.00.
Based on the events that occurred subsequent to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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-12the signing of the contract, it appears obvious that it was
not Mr. Nixon's intent to move with dispatch in the development of the property and in accordance with his thinking,
why should he?

The interest of New diminished as time went

on, and if and when Nixon reached a point where he thought
the development of the.property didn't make any economic
sense to him, he had the right, under the terms of the
contract, to require New to pay him $100,000.00 and re-purchase
the property.

Based upon the testimony of New at the trial,

the property was worth in excess of $200,000.00.

(T-131)

Nixon's counsel in his brief at page 18 argued
that Nixon stood to lose more than New in the deal if the
development of the property was delayed.

We do not believe

that is true.
Obviously, Nixon put up approximately $77,000.00
to purchase the property, but the property was worth $200,000
plus and all he ever had to pay to New was the difference
between the $77,000 he put up and $130,000, or $54,000,
and New was obligated to pay off all the liens and encumbrances.
Therefore, there was no way that Nixon could lose, and if he
ultimately decided he no longer wanted to be bothered, and
that was at his sole option, he could require. New to repurchase the prope;ty for $100,000.
On the other hand, however, New's interest diminished
as time went on and in the mind of Nixon by the time of
trial, it had already been diminished by approximately
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-13was obligated to pay over to New.

Admittedly, there were

some liens that had to be removed, but it was evident at the
time of the negotiation between the parties that most of the
liens had already been paid, they simply had not yet been
removed from the title to the property.

(T-117)

Nixon

believed that most of the liens and encumbrances that had
shown on the title report of the property had either been
paid, settled or forfeited, and that in some way they had
been taken care of.

{T-63)

Appellant claims that New is in violation of two
fundamental maxims of etjuity, towit:

"He who seeks equity,

must do equity" and "He who comes into equity, must come
with clean hands."

He argues that New had taken matters

into his own hands and had not sought judicial assistance
when he took over the development of the property.

It is

clear, however, that New made many attempts to contact Nixon
and Nixon would have nothing to do with him.

He would not

respond to his mail, he did not keep his appointments and he
did not return calls.

It was Nixon who prevented the

diligent and expeditious development of the property for a
benefit to himself and the detriment to New.
CONCLUSION
The contract did not provide a precise date at
which time the money would be paid by Nixon to New; it did
not provide a precise time in which the development would
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-14commence or be completed.

Nixon was able to delay development

of the property and by so doing, was able to diminish the
interest of New.

Both parties agreed upon execution of the

contract that New would receive approximately $54,000, since
the liens had all

eith~r

been paid, released or should have

been released, but by the interpretation of Mr. Nixon, he
was able to dimish the proposed payment to New by approximately $44,000.00.
The Court obviously saw through Nixon's scheme and
rightly concluded that Nixon could manipulate the contract
to his benefit and to the substantial economic detriment of
New because the time the development was to commence was
solely at the discretion of Nixon and in the event Nixon
determined that he did not want to .proceed with development
he could in turn require New to re-purchase the property for
$100,000.00.
The fact that times and dates were not firmly
fixed by the parties, but within the sole discretion of
Nixon and

allowed~him

to manipulate these matters to his

benefit and to the detriment of New was deemed unconscionable.
Hence, the Court properly exercised its

equi~y

powers to

prevent that injustice.
This Court, now having heard the testimony, should
not now interfere with the lower Court's decision and Judge
Gould's decision should be affirmed.
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